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Enactive cognitive science (ECS) and ecological psychology (EP) agree that active
movement is important for perception, but they remain ambiguous regarding the precise
role of agency. EP has focused on the notion of sensorimotor invariants, according
to which bodily movements play an instrumental role in perception. ECS has focused
on the notion of sensorimotor contingencies, which goes beyond an instrumental
role because skillfully regulated movements are claimed to play a constitutive role.
We refer to these two hypotheses as instrumental agency and constitutive agency,
respectively. Evidence comes from a variety of fields, including neural, behavioral, and
phenomenological research, but so far with confounds that prevent an experimental
distinction between these hypotheses. Here we advance the debate by proposing a
novel double-participant setup that aims to isolate agency as the key variable that
distinguishes bodily movement in active and passive conditions of perception. We pilot
this setup with a psychological study of width discrimination using the Enactive Torch,
a haptic sensory substitution device. There was no evidence favoring the stronger
hypothesis of constitutive agency over instrumental agency. However, we caution that
during debriefing several participants reported using cognitive strategies that did not
rely on spatial perception. We conclude that this approach is a viable direction for future
research, but that greater care is required to establish and confirm the desired modality
of first-person experience.
Keywords: active perception, embodied cognition, agency, perceptual discrimination, enactive perception,
Enactive Torch, volition, active touch
INTRODUCTION
The fields of enactive cognitive science (ECS) and ecological psychology (EP) are two prominent
alternatives to orthodox cognitive science, and which are in agreement about the need for a
relational account of mind situated at the personal level (Chemero, 2009). They also share a
commitment to the claim that perception is a dynamic process, and hence that movement is
essential for perception, yet they also disagree on a number of points regarding the nature
of perception (Varela et al., 2017; Heras-Escribano, 2019). It is still unclear whether these
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disagreements are signs of deeper conceptual differences, or
are merely differences in emphasis, which highlights the need
of establishing a closer dialog (Lobo, 2019). One major point
of contention is the precise role of agency in the perceptual
process. More specifically, it is still an open debate to what
extent action makes a difference to perception and perceptual
learning, i.e., whether it matters if bodily movements are
self-initiated, actively regulated, and/or intentionally guided,
or merely accidentally caused by the agent’s body, or even
completely environmentally driven.
Ecological psychology started as a non-representational
account of perception (Gibson, 1979), but has since developed
into a more comprehensive non-representational psychology.
As such, it also has a strong interest in agency and active
exploration (Heras-Escribano, 2019). Yet, arguably, it has most
famously focused on the experimental study of perceptual
invariants (Mossio and Taraborelli, 2008), which are arguably
independent of the source of perceptual change. In fact, some
do not require any bodily movement at all. For example,
when EP uses optic flow to derive time-to-contact it does not
matter whether perceptual flow is brought about by bodily
movements actively performed by the perceiver, or if flow
is just passively undergone due to changes in the perceiver’s
environment (i.e., produced “by object R as it moves toward
the eye,” Chemero, 2009, p. 124). More generally, EP does not
distinguish between: (1) optical changes due to intentional self-
movement, e.g., human locomotion, (2) optical changes due to
accidental self-movement, e.g., being hurled towards a collision,
and (3) optical changes due to environmental movement, e.g.,
an approaching ball to be intercepted; all of these changes can
be captured by the same invariant of optic flow because it is
mathematically defined independently of agency, namely as the
rate of acceleration of optical expansion (Lobo et al., 2018).
Research into active, dynamic or effortful touch may seem to
be provide a counterexample, but even here a key hypothesis is
that the perceptual capabilities are defined in terms of detection
of invariance in the patterns of tissue deformation (Carello and
Turvey, 2015); the source of the deformation is irrelevant for
the shape of the patterns. We will consider active touch in
more detail below.
To be fair, following Gibson, most classical, and contemporary
research in EP strongly emphasizes the importance of action
and agency for perception and human experience (e.g., Gibson,
1979; Reed, 1982; Käufer and Chemero, 2015). Nevertheless, it
is also fair to say that the focus of interest has been on the
other direction of influence, namely on the claim that actions
can be controlled by perception of affordances, like catching
an approaching baseball. It is sufficient for our argument that
both kinds of claims tend to be compatible with an instrumental
interpretation of the role of active movement in perception. Thus,
bodily movement is an important, but not exclusive, manner of
generating optic flow and detecting time to contact. The upshot
of this instrumental role, whereby e.g., the explanatory weight is
placed directly on the rate of optical expansion, is that EP – its
many claims to the contrary notwithstanding – is still partially
aligned with the orthodox “input-output picture” (Hurley, 1998).
At this stage, it remains unclear how perception would differ
when its invariants are instantiated for reasons other than self-
movement. We refer to this compatibility with an instrumental
role of self-movement as the hypothesis of instrumental agency.
This leads to the experimental prediction that perception should
be unaffected by whether the perceiver is actively exploring an
object or undergoing the same changes passively.
Enactive cognitive science, on the other hand, has famously
focused on the role of action in perception (Noë, 2004; O’Regan
et al., 2005; Myin, 2016; Di Paolo et al., 2017; Froese and
González-Grandón, 2019), which foregrounds the role of the
perceiver’s skillful capacity for regulating movement in the
constitution of perceptual experience. One key concept here is
that meaningful perception depends on the perceiver’s exercise
of their mastery of sensorimotor contingencies (O’Regan and Noë,
2001), i.e., of the regular ways in which sensations would change
as a consequence of bodily movements. The major approaches
to ECS differ in the details of how this dependence on the
exercise of mastery should be conceived (Bishop and Martin,
2014), e.g., in terms of metacognition, intentional directedness,
or adaptive regulation, but they share a common hypothesis
of constitutive agency. Although it is not exactly clear how
perception during active vs. passive movement conditions would
differ, the prediction is that the perceptual experience will be
affected in some way. For example, we might expect there
to be a difference in the qualitative feel of the experience
(O’Regan, 2011), there might be an attenuation in its felt
significance (Di Paolo et al., 2017), or an impaired sense of
object presence (Noë, 2012). As such, ECS goes beyond just EP’s
instrumental role of bodily movement and forms an important
part of the broader class of action-based theories of perception
(Briscoe and Grush, 2017).
Proponents of EP often make claims that also favor the
stronger hypothesis of constitutive agency, and it would be
interesting if EP developed those intuitions in a more explicit
manner. We hope that the kind of psychological study we will
propose can facilitate this process.
PREVIOUS WORK
Experimental evidence often cited by EP and ECS in support of
the importance of self-movement typically comes from two major
classic sources on perceptual learning and more recent versions:
(1) the “kitten carousel” studies initiated by Held and Hein
(1963), which concluded that passive exposure to optic flow
is not sufficient for the ontogenetic development of normal
visual perception, and
(2) the “sensory substitution” studies initiated by Bach-y-Rita
et al. (1969), which concluded that exposure to prerecorded
time series of sensory stimuli is not sufficient for the lifetime
learning of normal visual perception.
A key issue with source (1) is that it is problematic to derive
strong claims about the quality of perceptual experience based
on an animal behavioral result. According to Prinz (2006), it
is equally conceivable that the kittens from active and passive
conditions had exactly the same visual experiences, but that
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 April 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 809
fpsyg-11-00809 April 25, 2020 Time: 18:4 # 3
Froese and Ortiz-Garin Where Is the Action in Perception?
the kittens from the passive condition had not yet had the
opportunity to acquire an adequate mapping of that visual
experience to motor commands. In other words, it is still possible
to formulate an interpretation of the results that is consistent with
the orthodox input-out picture.
Held and Hein’s study was replicated and extended by
Walk et al. (1988). They added two new passive conditions:
one in which the kittens’ attention to visual stimuli was
enhanced by being able to control the automated movement
of their own cart, and another in which the kitten’s cart
remained immobile but was placed in front of a more dynamic
environmental spectacle involving moving toy cars. Even though
these kittens were unable to use their legs to self-locomote,
their legs responded appropriately to the visual cliff test. The
authors explained these results in terms of EP and argued that
what is important is attention to perceptual variation, but not
whether locomotion is self-initiated. Nevertheless, kittens in all
conditions were still capable of self-initiating movements of
their heads and eyes, and hence they could in fact actively
explore sensorimotor contingencies in this restricted visuomotor
domain. In other words, it is equally conceivable that the kittens
were sufficiently motivated to acquire mastery of these available
visuomotor contingencies.
Advances in technology have permitted much more
sophisticated versions of this paradigm. For example, a
recent study placed pairs of mice in a virtual reality setup
akin to the kitten carousel (Attinger et al., 2017). Each mouse
was placed on a large trackball in front of a screen with the
head fixed in position. Whenever the active mouse walked
its display would change accordingly, while the other mouse’s
trackball and display would change identically, forcing it to
undergo a similar visuomotor loop but without being able to
actively influence the visual stimulation. The authors analyzed
recordings of neural activity from primary visual cortex (V1)
and found that coupling between motor output and visual
feedback is necessary for the functional development of visual
processing. This result seems to favor constitutive agency.
However, even though the trackballs rotated identically, mice
in the uncoupled condition were able to move differently, and
hence were exposed to highly irregular sensorimotor invariances
and sensorimotor contingencies. It is therefore not surprising
that their perceptual skills developed poorly. Finally, although
differences in development of neural activity in V1 are suggestive,
it is not clear in general how such neural differences are related
to visual experience (Hurley and Noë, 2003).
Two common problems with these animal studies are that
it is difficult to isolate agency, and also to derive claims about
perceptual experience from behavioral and/or neural data.1
A more promising approach for the scientific study of the role
of active movement in perceptual experience are psychological
studies involving participants that can give reports about how
changes in conditions affect their first-person experience (Froese
et al., 2012b). This brings us to second classic source.
1These problems are also shared by agent-based simulation models that are
inspired by the hypothesis of constitutive agency (e.g., Suzuki et al., 2005;
Buhrmann et al., 2013). It is unclear whether synthetic approaches can capture
the relevant aspects of agency and experience (Froese and Taguchi, 2019).
In particular, the use of sensory substitution
interfaces provides a useful experimental technique for
simplifying and controlling human sensorimotor loops
(Bach-y-Rita and Kercel, 2003; Lenay et al., 2003; Froese
et al., 2012a). Such studies consistently find that performance on
perceptual tasks is improved when the changes in participant’s
sensations are contingent on their own movements (e.g., Bach-y-
Rita, 2002; Auvray et al., 2005; Díaz et al., 2012). However, none
of these sensory substitution studies has been able to address
the confound that was also an issue for the mouse virtual reality
study by Attinger et al. (2017): uncoupling sensory stimulation
from passive participants’ movements makes it impossible for
self-initiated movement to influence sensation, but at the same
time it scrambles the regularities inherent in sensorimotor
invariances and sensorimotor contingencies more generally. It is
therefore unclear whether it is the lack of sensorimotor regularity
or the lack of agency which causes the impaired performance.
In summary, so far these lines of research have been unable
to arbitrate between the two hypotheses with respect to the
role of agency. What is needed is an experimental approach
that ensures that both active and passive participants undergo
identical sensorimotor loops, involving the same sensations and
movements, but in such a way that only the active participant
can freely regulate the movements. This is necessary so that
any difference in performance can then be attributed to the
difference in participant’s active involvement in movement
(Richardson et al., 2000). It also remains to be seen if any
differences seen during perceptual learning would also still apply
to mature perception.
A fitting starting point is touch because it is one of the most
active modalities, although experimental results are not always
consistent with this impression (Symmons et al., 2004). This
ambiguity is likely related to the fact that control conditions are
often not strict enough. For instance, a study of discrimination
of arm movement distances found that active movement is
associated with greater precision (van Beek et al., 2014). However,
the passive condition induced constant arm movement rather
than replicating actual movement patterns, and hence the
authors’ conclusion that taking away agency from tool operators
would deteriorate precision is not necessarily warranted.
Another study removed this confound by replicating patterns
of sensorimotor flow: an active participant manipulated a
haptic stylus (a Phantom device) to categorize one of four
different kinds of 3D geometric shapes, while at the same
time a passive participant held onto another Phantom device
that underwent the same movements and generated the same
feedback (Symmons et al., 2005). In this way, even the perception
of the location and movement of body parts, known as
proprioception or kinesthesia, is also largely kept the same across
participants. It was found that active participants tended to be
more accurate, but there was no statistically significant difference.
This result could be related to the fact that passive participants
were still relatively active: although they did not control the
direction of movement, they still had to actively grasp the stylus
and follow its trajectory in a compliant manner. To increase
passivity, it would be better if the passive condition involved no
effort of movement at all.
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In this brief research report, we describe a novel version of this
kind of double-participant setup that satisfies this stricter control
condition of passivity for the first time. We also present the results
of an exploratory study of width discrimination using this setup.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The double-participant setup was implemented with a custom-
made experimental box consisting of mechanical and electronic
components (see Figures 1, 2 for details). Pairs of participants
were seated at opposite sides and could undergo the same
movements (albeit in a mirrored direction) and changes in
vibrotactile sensations at the same time. The sensations were
mediated by a hand-held sensory substitution device called the
Enactive Torch (Figure 3; Froese et al., 2012a), which translates
infrared-based measures of distance to nearby objects into
intensity of vibrotactile feedback in the user’s hand. Like a cane
for blind people, this device permits people to learn to perceive
passages through objects in space (Favela et al., 2018), and
user’s walking trajectories coincide with those of visually-guided
locomotion (Lobo et al., 2019).
The crucial methodological advantage of working with the
Enactive Torch is that, by mediating object perception through
a fixed sensory substitution device, we could more easily ensure
that both participants underwent exactly the same sensorimotor
loop. Minor differences in proprioception cannot be ruled out
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the double-participant experimental setup. Several
elements of the setup are highlighted in the illustration. 1: The experimental
box, which is illustrated in more detail in Figure 2 below. 2: One of the
participants with opaque goggles and noise-canceling headphones to restrict
perception to the tactile modality. The dominant hand grasps an Enactive
Torch inside the box. 3: Laptop computer for data recording. 4: Button for
experimenter to start the next trial. 5: Circuit box to capture participant
responses.
because it encompasses a complex of sensations that includes
muscle force and effort (Taylor, 2009), which will necessarily
differ across active and passive participants.
The task was inspired by a recent study in EP on width
discrimination that involved the Enactive Torch (Favela et al.,
2018). In our study, participants had to discriminate between the
widths of two objects, and then to indicate which one was the
wider one and to indicate if this was a confident discrimination.
The two objects were 5 cm and 8 cm wide, which resulted in
roughly 70% correct responses after data normalization. This
level of discrimination difficulty was chosen as a value between
chance level (50%) and potential ceiling effects (100%).
Participants
In total, we tested 70 participants (32 men and 38 women; mean
age = 21.48, SD = 2.59) combined into 35 pairs. All participants
were recruited from our research group and students’ networks
of contacts at the National Autonomous University of Mexico
(UNAM). They volunteered to participate without financial
reward and signed informed consent forms. All participants were
right-handed, and all reported no psychiatric or motor disorders.
Procedure
Each participant of a test pair was randomly assigned to one
of two groups: passive or active. They were unaware of this
assignment, and while they could guess that another person was
being tested in the same room, they remained unaware of the fact
that they were connected in a pair. Participants were blindfolded
and then one-by-one guided into the experimental room, where
they were seated on a chair, on one side of the wooden box.
The side was randomly assigned. They wore headphones that
played noise in the background to avoid distraction of sounds;
we chose brown over white noise because participants prefer
lower frequencies of sound masking (Hongisto et al., 2015). Then
the participants underwent a brief training procedure, which
consisted in the following steps:
1. One participant removed their headphones.
2. They were then guided to grasp their respective Enactive
Torch. They were also familiarized with the two sets
of buttons to indicate the wider object and their
level of confidence.
3. All the instructions were given. A similar but subtly
different instruction was given depending on the group, as
explained below.
4. Two test trials were run, involving two objects with 3 cm
difference in width.
5. The participant was given an opportunity to ask questions.
6. The participant puts on their headphones again.
Then the other participant underwent the same training steps.
Regarding the specific instructions, for the active group, the
instructions were to grasp the Enactive Torch with their
dominant hand and to move it horizontally (right to left or
vice-versa) at a constant speed for a particular period to sense
the width of the two objects. The duration of each trial was
5 s. Participants were to start moving when they heard a beep,
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FIGURE 2 | Schematics of the experimental box. Several details are highlighted in color and described in the figure’s legend. Panels show different perspectives on
the box. (A) Illustration of the dimensions of the box. Note that both Enactive Torch sensory substitution devices are attached on top of the same wooden bar that
connects the two vertical sliding boards, thereby ensuring that both participants undergo the same horizontal displacement and receive the same vibrotactile
feedback. Each participant’s end of the wooden bar also featured a set of two buttons on the side; the button closer to the sensor head indicated confidence in the
discrimination response provided with the button box held in the left hand. (B) Close-up of a participant’s side of the box. Circular cavities were made to the sliding
boards so that participants could reach in to grasp their Enactive Torch. Arrows indicate possibility of horizontal displacement. (C) Close-up of side of the box
showing that the sensor heads of the Enactive Torch was oriented upwards at 90◦. This prevented interference between the two devices and enabled detection of
target objects placed on top of the box.
and when they heard the beep again, they were to stop and
click to indicate which of the two objects was the wider one.
They also clicked on one of the other two buttons next to the
Enactive Torch to indicate their level of confidence. They then
returned the Enactive Torch to the starting point before the next
trial could begin.
For the passive group, the instructions were to rest their
dominant hand on the Enactive Torch, and to avoid any
resistance to the movements that were going to be produced after
the beep. They were also told that when the same tone rang
again, the device was going to come to rest, and they should
perform the required button clicks. Then the bar would return
to its starting point.
No feedback was provided during the experiment. In total, 120
trials were run per pair of participants. However, for the current
research question, only the first 60 trials were analyzed given that
the second set of 60 trials involved a different condition. At the
end of every experiment, we individually asked the participants
about the strategies they used to solve the task.
Data Analysis
Statistical analysis of task performance was carried out using
the software R released by the R Core Team (2019). We first
obtained the proportion of correct answers for every participant,
and then obtained the descriptive statistics of the proportions for
each group. We ran a two-tailed paired t-test analysis to compare
the proportions of correct answers for both groups. The null
hypothesis was that there are no differences between the average
percentages of correct responses between groups.
RESULTS
The responses recorded for all trials can be found in
Supplementary Datasheet S1. The descriptive statistics of the
proportion of correct answers is summarized in Table 1.
No statistically significant differences were found among the
active and passive groups in terms of the proportions of correct
responses [t(34) = -0.74734, p = 0.46], nor of confident responses
[t(34) = -1.4639, p = 0.1524]. Therefore, actively initiated
and regulated sensorimotor loops and passively undergone
sensorimotor loops led to the same proportion of correct answers.
Informal debriefing interviews after each experiment revealed
that some participants had used a counting strategy to solve
the width discrimination task. For example, several reported
that they would start counting at the start of the first phase of
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FIGURE 3 | Photo of the Enactive Torch Research Tool (ETRT). We made use
of ETRT v1.0. Note that for this study we turned the sensor head upwards at
a 90◦C angle so that subjects were given vibrotactile sensations
corresponding to the objects placed on top of the experimental box, as
illustrated in Figures 2, 3. The photo also shows the data cable and a cable
with a small actuator and its extension cable for external vibrotactile output.
For this study we transferred data to the laptop computer via Bluetooth and
employed the vibrating actuator built into the ETRT itself.
TABLE 1 | Summary of descriptive statistics.
Group Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
Correct responses
(correct vs. incorrect)
Active 0.708 0.717 0.102 0.500 0.917
Passive 0.721 0.721 0.081 0.517 0.867
Confident responses
(certain vs. uncertain)
Active 0.680 0.7 0.126 0.433 1
Passive 0.731 0.733 0.149 0.383 0.983
The active and passive groups were compared in terms of the proportion of correct
answers to the width discrimination task.
vibrotactile feedback until the end of that phase, do the same for
the second phase of feedback, and then compared the counts to
determine which object took longer to be traversed. This strategy
was aided by the fact that many active participants chose to move
slowly within the 5 s limit of a trial. In other words, for these
participants width discrimination performance was not based on
tactile space perception.
DISCUSSION
The null result is more in line with the more conservative
hypothesis of instrumental agency, rather than with the stronger
hypothesis of constitutive agency. However, in hindsight the
experimental setup still needs to be improved in several
respects.
• Attentional load. Poorer performance during the active
condition could have resulted from interfering effects
of increased attentional and cognitive load, which
have been attributed to decisions about how to move
(Richardson et al., 1981). Conversely, reduction of
cognitive load in active conditions has been associated with
a relative increase in haptic discrimination performance
(Richardson et al., 2006).
• Cognitive strategies. Several participants reported a
cognitive (counting and comparing) strategy, which
implies that they did not actually perceive width. If so,
then the passive group was not necessarily disadvantaged;
to the contrary, being moved enabled them to focus their
attention on the cognitive strategy. It is possible that the
training was not sufficient for perceptual learning, thereby
forcing participants to rely on a cognitive strategy.
• Potential movement. The ECS theory of sensorimotor
contingencies only requires overt movement for the
learning or acquisition of mastery, but not for the
subsequent exercise of that mastery, which also works with
potential movement (Myin, 2016). Future work should
record muscle and/or neural activity in order to try to
detect the implicit exercise of mastery of sensorimotor
contingencies (Froese and González-Grandón, 2019).
Alternatively, the passive condition could involve a
mechanical device that fixes the participant’s arm and forces
it to reproduce exactly the same movement pattern as the
active condition, but this is more difficult to implement
than the double-participant setup.
• Degrees of freedom. The active group might have been
overly constrained, which leveled the playing field with
the passive condition. This was done to ensure that all
trials were comparable across participants. Future work
in this direction will have to learn to embrace the
possibilities of open-ended exploration and the individual
variability that this will generate. In particular, it may be
necessary to consider tasks that permit the spontaneous
transition between several possible stable patterns of
behavior (Dotov et al., 2019).
• From ends to means. Normally perception is a means to an
end, but in our task perception was the end itself. Again,
this may have invited more cognitive strategies. It would
therefore be preferable to turn perceptual discrimination
into a function at the service of a higher-level action goal
(Favela et al., 2018).
More generally, future work in this direction needs to pay
greater attention to whether participants are learning to
solve the task by incorporating the sensorimotor mediation
afforded by the sensory substitution device into a genuinely
perceptual experience (Schumann and O’Regan, 2017). This
points to a crucial methodological problem: how to better assess
participants’ experience of using a sensory substitution interface
(Kałwak et al., 2018). As revealed in this study, good performance
on a perceptual task is not sufficient to discriminate between
perceptual and cognitive strategies. And while simple subjective
reports can aid in making coarse-grained categorizations, it
remains to be seen how we can obtain more fine-grained
distinctions. For instance, it is conceivable that ECS and EP
will come to agree that, after learning, sensorimotor invariants
are sufficient for objectively discriminating what is perceived –
e.g., time-to-contact (instrumental agency), and that active self-
movement then only makes a difference for the subjective
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experience of how it is perceived – e.g., the conscious feel of vision
(constitutive agency), for example with respect to the richness
of its presence. However, the details still need to be worked
out and operationalized. Moreover, tracking differences in “what
it is like” is precisely the problem of consciousness and calls
for specialized first-person methods (Petitmengin et al., 2019).
Accordingly, despite repeated claims that active movement is
essential, there is still more theoretical and experimental work to
be done to determine precisely where is the action in perception.
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